British firm with links to William Hague sells 'protester-tracking' product to Iran

William Hague


A British technology firm with links to William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, has sold a product to Iran which could be used to track down protesters.

By Holly Watt, Claire Newell and Helia Ebrahimi

The Telegraph - 07 November, 2011 - Creativity Software sold the product to the regime despite concerns that it has been used to round up activists communicating with their mobile phones.

The main bankroller of the company is MMC Ventures, whose chief executive and chairman both funded Mr Hague’s private office until recently.

SHELTON: Ending hypocrisy of terrorist designation

Friends are branded as enemies while real enemies are appeased

As two current high-profile cases demonstrate, the U.S. government's practice of listing "foreign terrorist organizations" (FTOs) has become an increasingly dangerous and hollow political exercise rather than a sober assessment of the real threats to America.
Last month, Afghanistan's ruthless Haqqani Network reportedly staged a brazen attack against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The Haqqanis, who conduct grisly terrorist attacks on hotels, embassies and other targets to advance their agenda to become power brokers in a future political settlement, reportedly are responsible for hundreds of American deaths since 2001. Some American military officers apparently are furious that the Obama administration decided not to designate the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization because it was feared that listing the group would make it harder for the Afghan government to negotiate with the Haqqanis.

Report Details Torture at Secret Baghdad Prison

By SAM DAGHER

BAGHDAD — The torture of Iraqi detainees at a secret prison in Baghdad was far more systematic and brutal than initially reported, Human Rights Watch reported on Tuesday.

The existence of the prison, which housed mostly Sunni Arab prisoners, has created a political furor in Iraq, prompted government denials and fanned sectarian tensions.

“Abu Ghraib was a picnic” compared with the secret prison, said Sheik Abdullah Humedi Ajeel al-Yawar, one of the most influential Sunni Arab tribal leaders in the northern province of Nineveh, where the detainees were rounded up by Iraqi soldiers based on suspicions that they had links to the insurgency and brought to Baghdad with little due process. Abu Ghraib is the prison at which American guards tortured Iraqi prisoners, severely damaging Iraqis’ trust in the United States.

Human Rights Watch gained access on Monday to about 300 male detainees transferred from the once secret prison at the Old Muthanna military airfield to the Rusafa prison in Baghdad and documented its findings, which it described as “credible and consistent,” in a draft report provided to The New York Times on Tuesday by the rights group.

The group said it had interviewed 42 detainees who displayed fresh scars and wounds. Many said they were raped, sodomized with broomsticks and pistol barrels, or forced to engage in sexual acts with one another and their jailers.

All said they were tortured by being hung upside down and then whipped and kicked before being suffocated with a plastic bag. Those who passed out were revived, they said, with electric shocks to their genitals and other parts of their bodies.

“The horror we found suggests torture was the norm in Muthanna,” said Joe Stork, deputy director of the Middle East program at Human Rights Watch. Mr. Stork called on the Iraqi government to conduct a thorough investigation and prosecute all officials “responsible for this systematic brutality.”

The prison’s discovery comes at a delicate time for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, who is vigorously working to keep power after his coalition narrowly lost the March 7 national elections.

The revelations could further polarize Iraqis, still coming to grips with the scars of the sectarian conflict between 2005 and 2007. All those held at the secret prison before it was shut down were brought to Baghdad from Sunni Arab areas in Nineveh where Mr. Maliki, a Shiite, is largely perceived as a sectarian leader with a personal vendetta against anyone associated with the former Sunni-led government of Saddam Hussein.

Sheik Abdullah Humedi, the tribal leader from Nineveh, warned that the torture revelations had once more inflamed sectarian passions and could plunge the country into a fresh cycle of violence.

“This breeds extremism,” he said. “In our country a man who is raped will commit suicide, and how do you think he will do it?”

At least 505 cases of torture were documented in Iraqi prisons in 2009, according to a report released by the State Department in March.

In an interview broadcast on Monday night on the government-controlled Iraqiya television station, Mr. Maliki by turns denied, played down and distanced himself from the latest torture allegations. He described them as “lies” and “a smear campaign” hatched by foreign embassies and the media and then perpetuated by his political rivals.

“There are no secret prisons in Iraq at all,” he said.

Mr. Maliki described the prison at Muthanna as a transit site under the control of the Ministry of Defense, which used it for a “specific period.” He said that seven judges operated at the prison and that most of the approximately 430 detainees held there were transferred to the Rusafa prison. The rest were freed before the existence of the site was first reported last week.

Mr. Maliki maintained that a group of lawmakers from rival political factions visited the prison this year and instructed the prisoners to make false charges and to give themselves scars by “rubbing matches on some of their body parts.”

Nonetheless, Mr. Maliki said that he ordered an investigation and that several officers at the prison were being interrogated.

“America is the symbol of democracy, but then you have the abuses at Abu Ghraib,” Mr. Maliki said. “The American government took tough measures, and we are doing the same, so where is the problem and why this raucousness?”

Mr. Maliki’s comments appeared to contradict information provided by a minister in his own government, officials at the United States Embassy in Baghdad and the latest Human Rights Watch findings.

Wijdan Salim, minister of human rights, said in an interview last week that she insisted on visiting the secret prison after learning of its existence and that she found evidence of abuses that were “against human rights and the law.” Furthermore, the prison was under the control of the Baghdad Operations Command, a security task force answering directly to Mr. Maliki.

While investigative judges were stationed at the secret prison, they appeared to be complicit in the torture, according to Human Rights Watch.

A judge “heard cases in a room down the hall from one of the torture chambers,” the prisoners told Human Rights Watch.

One of the detainees, a former Iraqi Army general who uses a wheelchair and who holds British citizenship, said he was tortured by 10 people: 6 soldiers and 4 members of the investigative team.

“They applied electricity to my penis and sodomized me with a stick,” he told Human Rights Watch. “I was forced to sign a confession that they would not let me read.”

Another detainee, a 21-year-old who was arrested at his home in Mosul in December, said that during one torture session he was blindfolded, handcuffed, stripped naked and then raped by another prisoner as the wardens laughed at his screams of pain.

A third detainee, who was also arrested in December, said that he had been strung upside down and severely beaten to the point where some of his ribs were broken and that he had suffered concussions. The beatings caused him to “urinate blood for days,” he said. The same man said two wardens threatened him with rape unless he had sex with another prisoner.

“Security officials whipped detainees with heavy cables, pulled out finger and toenails, burned them with acid and cigarettes, and smashed their teeth,” Human Rights Watch said.

Source:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/middleeast/28baghdad.html

Reality Check: Understanding the Mujahedin-e Khalq (PMOI/ MEK)

By: Ali Safavi

Aside from the clearly false allegations against the MEK, which have been addressed in previous posts, some of the MEK's activities inside Iran prior to 2001 have been cited by the US Department of State and others as providing ostensible justification for the terrorist label against the organization. The MEK's activities have been painted with an unjustified brush of terrorism, thereby conflating instances of otherwise legitimate resistance against a tyrannical system with horrid acts of blind terrorism. Readers are welcomed to comment or ask questions if they so wish.

MEK: Resistance Against Tyranny
"The Islam we profess does not condone bloodshed. We have never sought, nor do we welcome confrontation and violence... We do not fear election results, whatever they may be... If Khomeini had allowed half or even a quarter of the freedoms presently enjoyed in France, we would have certainly achieved a democratic victory." ~ Massoud Rajavi


Immediately after the anti-monarchic revolution in 1979, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) began a nationwide political campaign to promote its belief in the absolute need to respect hard won freedoms and democratic rights. This principled position starkly contrasted with that of the organization's main rival, the clerical regime's founder, Khomeini, who sought to institutionalize his theocratic idea of absolute clerical rule (velayat-e faqih) after hijacking the leadership of the revolution.

The fundamental differences and contrasts between the MEK and Khomeini predated the revolution. In political terms, the MEK had called for the establishment of secular democratic rule while Khomeini had announced his intentions to form an "Islamic" government antagonistic to the modern political notions of popular elections, secularism and the rule of law. Ideologically, while Khomeini's lectures and texts were characterized by a profoundly backward fundamentalist streak, the MEK was committed to a tolerant and modern interpretation of Islam, with a heavy emphasis on freedom.

In a speech in 1980 on Tehran University campus, the MEK's historical leader, Massoud Rajavi, said, "No progress and mobilization for the revolution would be conceivable without guaranteeing freedom for all parties, opinions and writings. If by freedom we specifically have in mind free and just relationships domestically, independence speaks to the same meaning in our foreign and international relations. We do not accept anything less in the name of Islam."[1]

On the other hand, Khomeini unambiguously and consistently rejected all talk of freedoms and fundamental human rights, instead justifying his newly established dictatorship under the cloak of Islam: "Even if they give all freedoms and complete independence to us, but take away the Quran, we would still reject it."[2] On May 23, 1978, he also said, "Freedom may be provided to you, and so may independence ... But did the nation want freedom without the Quran? ... Did it sacrifice its blood for freedom or for God? It wanted Islam."[3]

For the MEK, however, the antimonarchic revolution and sacrifices made by the Iranian people had only one objective: democracy. US historian, and a present-day detractor of the MEK, Ervand Abrahamian, wrote in this respect, "In criticizing the regime's political record, the Mujahedin moved the issue of democracy to center stage. They argued that the regime had broken all the democratic promises made during the revolution; that an attack on any group was an attack on all groups; that the issue of democracy was of 'fundamental importance...'"[4]

In order to fully consolidate his regime's undemocratic rule and his own position as the "Supreme Leader" in the months after the 1979 revolution, Khomeini gradually eliminated all semblances of peaceful political activity, ordering his extremist and fundamentalist followers (known as "hezbollahis") to attack and disrupt rallies by opposition groups, ranging from liberals to leftists. Thousands were arrested and imprisoned between 1979 and 1981.[5] While, in response, several political groups chose to engage in a premature armed resistance against the Khomeini regime, the MEK, as Iran's largest political opposition at the time, did its utmost to prevent the window for peaceful political activity from closing.

More than a quarter century ago, even the Department of State acknowledged these facts. A 1984 unclassified report on the MEK submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives by the Department of State, said in part: "When Khomeini took power, the Mujahedin called for continued revolution, but said they would work for change within the legal framework of the new regime [...] The Mujahedin unsuccessfully sought a freely elected constituent assembly to draft a constitution. [...] The Mujahedin similarly made an attempt at political participation when Mujahedin leader Masud [Massoud] Rajavi ran for the presidency in January 1980. Rajavi was forced to withdraw when Ayatollah Khomeini ruled that only candidates who had supported the constitution in the December referendum - which the Mujahedin had boycotted - were eligible."[6]

The report went on to say, "Rajavi's withdrawal statement emphasized the group's efforts to conform to election regulations and reiterated the Mujahedin's intention to advance its political aims within the new legal system. Between the two election rounds, the Mujahedin announced that its members would disarm to prove that they were not initiating the clashes with the fundamentalists that had become endemic during the campaign. The fundamentalists responded by once again banning Mujahedin representatives from the university campuses. [...] In the early summer of 1980 the Mujahedin staged several rallies in Tehran drawing up to 150,000 people to hear Rajavi promise to carry on the opposition to fundamentalist domination. On June 25 Khomeini responded by a major statement against the Mujahedin, claiming their activities would derail the revolution and bring back 'US dominance.'"[7]

An Iran expert, Shaul Bakhash, recounts some of the suppressive measures against the MEK as such: "In February 1980, 60,000 copies of Mojahed [the MEK's weekly] were seized and burned. In Mashad, Shiraz, Qa'emshahr, Sari, and dozens of small towns, club wielders attacked and looted Mojahedin headquarters, student societies, and meetings. ... Some 700 were injured in the attack on the Mojahedin headquarters at Qa'emshahr in April, 400 in Mashad. Ten members of the organization lost their lives in clashes between February and June 1980."[8]

Even after Khomeini's public threats, Bakhash writes, "The Mojahedin responded by quietly closing all their branch offices."[9] Indeed, the MEK refrained from any confrontation and "participated eagerly in the parliamentary elections."[10]

Similarly, Abrahamian notes that Khomeini's attacks against the MEK "caused three deaths and over 1000 casualties. The attack on the Tehran rally, which drew 200,000 participants, left twenty-three Mojahedin sympathizers seriously injured."[11]

In that rally held on June 12, 1980, in Tehran's Amjadieh soccer stadium, Rajavi had exhorted the crowd to "defend freedoms... freedom of speech, association and gatherings."[12] Two weeks later, Khomeini drew the line. "Our enemy," he said, "is neither in the United States, nor the Soviet Union, nor Kurdistan, but right here, under our nose, in Tehran."[13]

"By early June 1981, the prisons - especially in Tehran, the central cities, and the Caspian towns - contained more than 1,180 Mojaheds."[14]. Furthermore, "the hezbollahis ... began a reign of terror. They shot news stand owners selling Mojahedin publications; beat up suspected sympathizers; bombed homes (including that of the Rezai family); broke into the offices of the Muslim Student Association; disrupted conferences, especially the Congress of Trade Unions; and physically attacked meetings."[15] Abrahamian adds that "by 20 June 1981" these attacks "had left seventy-one mojaheds dead."[16].

Despite tolerating these incredible hardships, which had no justification whatsoever, the MEK did not retaliate for two and a half grueling years. As such, the MEK continued to gain the support of a vast majority of Iranians nationwide, which Khomeini could in no way tolerate. Former President and head of the State Exigency Council, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, acknowledged that the MEK had more than half-a-million full-time and part-time activists around the country.[17] Many experts believed that they would have finished first if free elections were to be held.

The MEK refrained from violent retaliation against Khomeini and his forces because it believed that to prolong the political process is in the interest of the organization and the Iranian people, while violence would serve the interests of Khomeini. It sought to use every tangible and intangible legal and peaceful option, no matter how negligible or insignificant, to reform Khomeini's policies and guarantee the desired freedoms and human rights for the Iranian people without resorting to confrontation.

In the context of the post-revolutionary developments, June 20, 1981 was a historic showdown. The MEK secretly organized a peaceful demonstration that caught the regime completely off guard. Throngs began to march from different parts of Tehran, and converged on Enghelab (Revolution) Street. The crowd was half-a-million strong when it reached Ferdowsi Square in the center of Tehran. They continued to march toward the Majlis (Parliament), and if allowed to continue, the crowd would have swelled to one million and Khomeini would have lost control. So, he personally ordered the Revolutionary Guards to open fire. Hundreds were killed and thousands were arrested.[18]

In this way, Khomeini closed the final chapter on peaceful activities, unleashing a bloody reign of terror, in which tens of thousands were slaughtered and tens of thousands more imprisoned and tortured.[19] The MEK, and indeed every patriotic Iranian, was left with only two choices: either surrender to Khomeini's tyrannical rule, thereby betraying commitments to fundamental freedoms and human rights, or wage a legitimate resistance against Khomeini's tyranny. Only after exhausting all possible peaceful options, the MEK chose the latter.

The MEK's resistance against the onslaught by the reactionary clerics was an understandable defensive posture. Simply stated, were it not for the MEK's resistance against the mullahs, the millions of Iranians who fled the mullahs' reign of terror could not have found the opportunity to do so. Some 80 percent of four million Iranian refugees left Iran from 1981 to 1984.

Importantly, there has not been a single credible and independently verifiable finding that the MEK ever targeted any civilians or non-combatants. This is why the Iranian mullahs have been at pains to fabricate plausible cases against the MEK. The US State Department's 1997 assertion, therefore, that the MEK is essentially a violent organization belies obvious historical facts and its own public records and acknowledgments to the US Congress.

The MEK does not believe in violence as a matter of philosophy. More than 26 years ago, Massoud Rajavi said the following on the subject: "The Islam we profess does not condone bloodshed. We have never sought, nor do we welcome confrontation and violence. To explain, allow me to send a message to Khomeini through you... My message is this: If Khomeini is prepared to hold truly free elections, I will return to my homeland immediately. The Mujahedin will lay down their arms to participate in such elections. We do not fear election results, whatever they may be... If Khomeini had allowed half or even a quarter of the freedoms presently enjoyed in France, we would have certainly achieved a democratic victory."[20]

But, Khomeini clearly rejected any ideas calling for democracy and freedoms. "If instead of him," Khomeini once said referring to the deposed Shah, "a regime were to be established like those in Europe or France, which have no relation to Islam, a free government which is also independent and guarantees freedoms, we have never wanted and will never condone such a thing because its freedoms are not in tune with Islam."[21]

To be sure, there is nothing illegitimate about using all options to resist against tyranny when all avenues for peaceful (legal) political activity are, in practice, eliminated. This is supported by the collective historical knowledge of cases where nations were in fact built or liberated by the force of arms. America's War of Independence was violent in nature. Charles de Gaulle and the French partisans used every means available to them to defeat the Nazi occupation of France. Col. Claus von Stauffenberg and his colleagues tried to bring down the Third Reich by eliminating Hitler and his generals, for which they were honored posthumously years later.[22] In Norway, a museum pays tribute those who fought and died in the resistance against the puppet Vidkun Quisling government. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela's African National Congress (ANC) resorted to bombings, sabotage and armed attacks against the white minority during the fight against Apartheid. Interestingly, in a sign of how out of synch the US terrorist list is with political realities, Mandela remained on the US terror list 15 years after receiving the Novel Peace Prize.[23]

It is an indisputable fact that every citizen has the undeniable right to the basic freedoms recognized by the international community. In view of that, limits placed on attempts to endeavor for liberty and to resist dictatorship are morally and legally inexcusable. There can be no double standards. America's Founding Fathers, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and distinguished Western statesmen have underscored this fact:

   1. Thomas Jefferson said in his "Declaration on Taking up Arms" in 1775, "Against violence actually offered, in defense of that freedom which is our birthright, we have taken up arms. We shall lay them down when hostilities have ceased on the part of the aggressors, and all danger of their being renewed have been removed, and not before."[24]
   2. In his inaugural address in 1861, the 16th US President Abraham Lincoln said, "This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it."[25]
   3. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right "to have recourse as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, and take up arms."[26]
   4. The International Committee of the Red Cross's commentary on Article 3 of the First Geneva Convention refers to discussions at the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva to ratify the Conventions in 1949: "It sometimes happens in a civil war that those who are regarded as rebels are in actual fact patriots struggling for the independence and dignity of their country... It was not possible to talk of 'terrorism', 'anarchy', or 'disorders' in the case of rebels who complied with humanitarian principles."[27]
   5. The late U.S. President John F. Kennedy said: "Those who make peaceful change impossible make violent change inevitable."[28]
   6. The Catholic Church, which in general opposes the use of violence, has also recognized this right. A document "Christian Liberty and Liberation," made public by the Vatican in 1986, states: "Armed struggle is the last resort to end blatant and prolonged oppression which has seriously violated the fundamental rights of individuals and has dangerously damaged the general interest of a country."[29]
   7. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in Oslo, President Obama talked about the concept of a "juts war," suggesting that it was justified "if it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense...," adding, "... make no mistake: Evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda's leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism -- it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason."[30]

Therefore, armed resistance against the clerical regime, and especially its specific application by the MEK (carried out prior to 2001), was completely justifiable and legitimate, at least according to the universally-established international democratic norms and legal criteria.

Aside from all this, although the end does not always justify the means, in this particular case, too much focus and emphasis on the methods of resistance obscures the noble end and takes the spotlight off the regime's inhumane crimes. The main issue and the reason for the MEK's activities revolve around democracy and popular sovereignty in their home country since day one. That is why, even prior to voluntarily handing over all its weapons in 2003 to Coalition Forces in Iraq,[31] and in fact since the early 1980s, the MEK has repeatedly declared its readiness to take park in a free and fair election under the auspices of the United Nations and fully accept the results of a genuinely democratic plebiscite in Iran.[32]

This explains why before 2001, when the MEK ceased its military actions in Iran, a majority in the US House of Representatives and 32 Senators as well as majorities in the UK House of Commons and in several European parliaments, including Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium and Norway, voiced support for the MEK as a "legitimate opposition [movement]," that is "working to establish a democratic and pluralistic system in the country,"[33].

Endnotes
[1] Massoud Rajavi, "Future of the Revolution," speech in Tehran University, January 10, 1980, text published in Mojahed, Vol. 2, no. 19. January 15, 1980.
[2] Sahifey-e Noor [Essays of Light], (A compilation of Khomeini's lectures, speeches and letters), a publication of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Tehran: 1983, Vol. 7, p. 486.
[3] Ibid., p. 461.
[4] Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mujahedeen, (New Haven: Yale University, Press, 1989), p. 215.
[5] Ibid., pp. 211-213; 216-217. See also Eric Rouleau, "A report from Tehran", Le Monde, March 29 and June 14, 1980.
[6] The unclassified background report on the MEK accompanied a letter by Tapely Bennet, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, to Representative Lee H. Hamilton, December 14, 1984.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 123.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 195-196.
[12] Mojahed, MEK's official organ, no. 87, June 14, 1980.
[13] Khomeini's speech, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), June 25, 1980.
[14] Abrahamian, op. cit., p. 211.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] See also, Ali Agha Mohammadi, then-Khamenei's advisor on Iraq: "In the early years of the revolution, the Mojahedin had organized about 500,000 activists across the country," State-controlled daily, Asr-e Azadegan, January 4, 2000.
[18] Abrahamian, op. cit., pp. 218-219. Abrahamian described June 20, thus:"On 20 June, vast crowds appeared in many cities, especially in Tehran, Tabriz, Rasht, Amol, Qiyamshahr, Gorgan, Babolsar, Zanjan, Karaj, Arak, Isfahan, Birjand, Ahwaz and Kerman. The Tehran demonstration, drew as many as 500,000 determined participants. Warnings against demonstrations were constantly broadcast over the radio-television network. Government supporters advised the public to stay at home: for example, Nabavi's Organization of the Mojaheds of the Islamic Revolution20 beseeched the youth of Iran not to waste their lives for the sake of "liberalism and capitalism." Prominent clerics declared that demonstrators, irrespective of their age, would be treated as "enemies of God" and as such would be executed on the spot. Hezbollahis were armed and trucked in to block off the major streets. Pasdars were ordered to shoot. Fifty were killed, 200 injured, and 1,000 arrested in the vicinity of Tehran University alone. This surpassed most of the street clashes of the Islamic Revolution. The warden of Evin Prison announced with much fanfare that firing squads had executed twenty-three demonstrators, including a number of teenage girls. The reign of terror had begun."[18]
[19] Ibid.
[20] Massoud Rajavi, interview in L'Unité, Paris, January 1, 1984.
[21] Sahifey-e Noor, op. cit., v. 8, p. 42.
[22] "Hitler plot 'heroes' commemorated", BBC News, July 20, 2004. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3908431.stm
[23] Bernd Debusmann, "America, Terrorists and Nelson Mandela," Reuters, January 15, 2010. http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2010/01/15/america-terrorists-and-nelson-mandela
[24] Thomas Jefferson, Declaration of Taking Up Arms: Resolutions of The Second Continental Congress, July 24, 1775, Available at: http://www.constitution.org/bcp/takuparm.htm. See also, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, collected and edited by Paul L. Ford (New York), 1892-1899, Vol. I, p. 475.
[25] Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, delivered on March 4, 1861. Available at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/lincoln1.htm
[26] Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the General Assembly, December 10, 1948.
[27] International Humanitarian Law - Treaties & Documents, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, [p.32] 2, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Available at: http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/1a13044f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/466097d7a301f8c4c12563cd00424e2b!OpenDocument
[28] Historical Quotes. Available at: http://www.muckraker-report.org/id88.html
[29] Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, President of the Pontifical Biblical Commission, L'Osservatore Romano, The Vatican, April 5, 1986.
[30] Remarks by President Obama at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, Oslo City Hall, White House Press Release, December 10, 2009. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize
[31] "Update on the Consolidation of the Mujahedin-E Khalq (MEK)," News Release, Headquarters United States Central Command, May 17, 2003. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/05/iraq-030517-centcom03.htm
[32] In a statement addressed to 2,000 members of parliaments around the world who had signed a joint declaration in support of the MEK in November 1997, Massoud Rajavi stressed: "This Resistance has repeatedly declared its readiness to take part in free and fair presidential elections under the auspices of the United Nations..." Lion and Sun, a publication of the Iranian Resistance, vol. 3, July 1998, p. 34.
[33] The House Magazine, The Parliamentary Weekly, No. 1031, Vol. 28, March 31, 2003.

Ali Safavi - Member of Iran's Parliament in Exile; President of Near East Policy Research

Source:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ali-safavi/reality-check-understandi_b_548491.html?view=print

Confused on Iran

The Washington Post - DEFENSE SECRETARY Robert M. Gates was the focus of one of those curious Washington kerfuffles over the weekend in which a senior official makes headlines by saying what everyone knows to be true. According to the New York Times, Mr. Gates dispatched a secret memo to the White House in January pointing out that the Obama administration does not have a well-prepared strategy in place for the likely eventuality that Iran will continue to pursue a nuclear weapon and will not be diverted by negotiations or sanctions. Mr. Gates quickly denied that his memo was intended as a "wake-up call," as one unnamed official quoted by the Times called it. And that's probably true: It is evident to any observer that the administration lacks a clear backup plan.

President Obama's official position is that "all options are on the table," including the use of force. But senior officials regularly talk down the military option in public -- thereby undermining its utility even as an instrument of intimidation. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered more reassurance to Iran on Sunday, saying in a forum at Columbia University that "I worry . . . about striking Iran. I've been very public about that because of the unintended consequences."

Adm. Mullen appeared to equate those consequences with those of Iran obtaining a weapon. "I think Iran having a nuclear weapon would be incredibly destabilizing. I think attacking them would also create the same kind of outcome," he was quoted as saying. Yet Israel and other countries in the region would hardly regard those "outcomes" as similar.

We are not advocating strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. But the public signs of the administration's squishiness about military options are worrisome because of the lack of progress on its two-track strategy of offering negotiations and threatening sanctions. A year-long attempt at engagement failed; now the push for sanctions is proceeding at a snail's pace. Though administration officials say they have made progress in overcoming resistance from Russia and China, it appears a new U.N. sanctions resolution might require months more of dickering. Even then it might only be a shell intended to pave the way for ad hoc actions by the United States and European Union, which would require further diplomacy.

And what would sanctions accomplish? Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told the Financial Times last week that "maybe . . . that would lead to the kind of good-faith negotiations that President Obama called for 15 months ago." Yet the notion that the hard-line Iranian clique now in power would ever negotiate in good faith is far-fetched. More likely -- and desirable -- would be a victory by the opposition Green movement in Iran's ongoing domestic power struggle. But the administration has so far shrunk from supporting sanctions, such as a gasoline embargo. that might heighten popular anger against the regime.

All this probably explains why Mr. Gates, in his own words, "presented a number of questions and proposals intended to contribute to an orderly and timely decision making process."
"There should be no confusion by our allies and adversaries," he added, "that the United States is . . . prepared to act across a broad range of contingencies in support of our interests." If allies and adversaries are presently confused, that would be understandable.

Gates Says U.S. Lacks a Policy to Thwart Iran

By DAVID E. SANGER and THOM SHANKER

The New York Times, WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has warned in a secret three-page memorandum to top White House officials that the United States does not have an effective long-range policy for dealing with Iran’s steady progress toward nuclear capability, according to government officials familiar with the document.

Several officials said the highly classified analysis, written in January to President Obama’s national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, came in the midst of an intensifying effort inside the Pentagon, the White House and the intelligence agencies to develop new options for Mr. Obama. They include a set of military alternatives, still under development, to be considered should diplomacy and sanctions fail to force Iran to change course.

Officials familiar with the memo’s contents would describe only portions dealing with strategy and policy, and not sections that apparently dealt with secret operations against Iran, or how to deal with Persian Gulf allies.

One senior official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the memo, described the document as “a wake-up call.” But White House officials dispute that view, insisting that for 15 months they had been conducting detailed planning for many possible outcomes regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

In an interview on Friday, General Jones declined to speak about the memorandum. But he said: “On Iran, we are doing what we said we were going to do. The fact that we don’t announce publicly our entire strategy for the world to see doesn’t mean we don’t have a strategy that anticipates the full range of contingencies — we do.”

But in his memo, Mr. Gates wrote of a variety of concerns, including the absence of an effective strategy should Iran choose the course that many government and outside analysts consider likely: Iran could assemble all the major parts it needs for a nuclear weapon — fuel, designs and detonators — but stop just short of assembling a fully operational weapon.

In that case, Iran could remain a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty while becoming what strategists call a “virtual” nuclear weapons state.

According to several officials, the memorandum also calls for new thinking about how the United States might contain Iran’s power if it decided to produce a weapon, and how to deal with the possibility that fuel or weapons could be obtained by one of the terrorist groups Iran has supported, which officials said they considered to be a less-likely possibility.

Mr. Gates has never mentioned the memo in public. His spokesman, Geoff Morrell, declined to comment on specifics in the document, but issued a statement on Saturday saying, “The secretary believes the president and his national security team have spent an extraordinary amount of time and effort considering and preparing for the full range of contingencies with respect to Iran.”

Pressed on the administration’s ambiguous phrases until now about how close the United States was willing to allow Iran’s program to proceed, a senior administration official described last week in somewhat clearer terms that there was a line Iran would not be permitted to cross.

The official said that the United States would ensure that Iran would not “acquire a nuclear capability,” a step Tehran could get to well before it developed a sophisticated weapon. “That includes the ability to have a breakout,” he said, using the term nuclear specialists apply to a country that suddenly renounces the nonproliferation treaty and uses its technology to build a small arsenal.

Nearly two weeks ago, Mr. Obama, in an interview with The New York Times, was asked about whether he saw a difference between a nuclear-capable Iran and one that had a fully developed weapon. “I’m not going to parse that right now,” he said. But he noted that North Korea was considered a nuclear-capable state until it threw out inspectors and, as he said, “became a self-professed nuclear state.”

Mr. Gates has alluded to his concern that intelligence agencies might miss signals that Iran was taking the final steps toward producing a weapon. Last Sunday on the NBC News program “Meet the Press,” he said: “If their policy is to go to the threshold but not assemble a nuclear weapon, how do you tell that they have not assembled? I don’t actually know how you would verify that.” But he cautioned that Iran had run into production difficulties, and he said, “It’s going slow — slower than they anticipated, but they are moving in that direction.”

Mr. Gates has taken a crucial role in formulating the administration’s strategy, and he has been known over his career to issue stark warnings against the possibility of strategic surprise.

Some officials said his memo should be viewed in that light: as a warning to a relatively new president that the United States was not adequately prepared.

He wrote the memo after Iran had let pass a 2009 deadline set by Mr. Obama to respond to his offers of diplomatic engagement.

Both that process and efforts to bring new sanctions against Iran have struggled. Administration officials had hoped that the revelation by Mr. Obama in September that Iran was building a new uranium enrichment plant inside a mountain near Qum would galvanize other nations against Iran, but the reaction was muted. The next three months were spent in what proved to be fruitless diplomatic talks with Iran over a plan to swap much of its low-enriched uranium for fuel for a medical reactor in Tehran. By the time Mr. Gates wrote his memo, those negotiations had collapsed.

Mr. Gates’s memo appears to reflect concerns in the Pentagon and the military that the White House did not have a well prepared series of alternatives in place in case all the diplomatic steps finally failed. Separately, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote a “chairman’s guidance” to his staff in December conveying a sense of urgency about contingency planning. He cautioned that a military attack would have “limited results,” but he did not convey any warnings about policy shortcomings.

“Should the president call for military options, we must have them ready,” the admiral wrote.

Administration officials testifying before a Senate committee last week made it clear that those preparations were under way. So did General Jones. “The president has made it clear from the beginning of this administration that we need to be prepared for every possible contingency,” he said in the interview. “That is what we have done from day one, while successfully building a coalition of nations to isolate Iran and pressure it to live up to its obligations.”

At the same hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr., director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Gen. James E. Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one of the military’s most experienced officers on nuclear matters, said that Iran could produce bomb-grade fuel for at least one nuclear weapon within a year, but that it would probably need two to five years to manufacture a workable atomic bomb.

The administration has been stepping up efforts to contain the influence of Iran and counter its missiles, including placing Patriot anti-missile batteries, mostly operated by Americans, in several states around the Persian Gulf. The Pentagon also is moving ahead with a plan for regional missile defense that reconfigures architecture inherited from the Bush administration to more rapidly field interceptors on land and at sea.

Source:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/world/middleeast/18iran.html?pagewanted=all

Iran's Ticking Bomb

Solana, Straw, Fischer, and de Villepin have a lot to answer for since their policy bought Tehran crucial time.

By ALEJO VIDAL-QUADRAS

Wall Street Journal Europe - Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad boasted last week that the regime would install 60,000 new, "third-generation" centrifuges to enrich uranium. As world leaders met in Washington this week to discuss how to prevent nuclear terrorism, there was little doubt that time is running out to deal with Iran's nuclear weapons threat.

It is now eight years since the opposition National Council of Resistance of Iran blew the lid on the mullahs' secret atom program and disclosed the existence of a uranium enrichment plant in Natanz and a heavy water plant for the production of plutonium in Arak. The NCRI also blew the whistle on the secret enrichment site in Qom back in 2005, a fact that was confirmed by world powers only last September. And yet, during all that time, Tehran has been allowed to make steady progress toward developing nuclear weapons.

Iran has had a lot of help along the way from what can only be described as appeasing policymakers who offered concessions and incentives, while telling the world that they could get the regime to change its behavior. And the regime did change its behavior: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei replaced the supposedly moderate President Mohammad Khatami with the fanatical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad while Iranian officials continuously vowed not to back down one "iota" from their nuclear projects.

Regrettably, the European Union was one of the main culprits in facilitating Iran's nuclear progress. Particularly the EU's former high representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana, as well as the former British, French and German foreign ministers—Jack Straw, Dominique de Villepin and Joschka Fischer—have a lot to answer for. It was they who devised this policy of "constructive engagement" and thus bought the regime many of the eight years they have had to advance their nuclear program.

The most popular excuse for the failure of their Iran policy was that U.S. reluctance to negotiate directly with Iran supposedly prevented a breakthrough with the mullahs. When President Obama took office, there was much hope in Europe. Last year, he extended his hand to the Iranian leadership and set a number of deadlines for a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Iran, though, quickly repelled Mr. Obama's hand. The President's deadlines came and went without any Iranian "engagement."

Now it was Washington that bought the regime additional time. The White House failed to quickly gather a coalition of the willing to implement the "biting" sanctions it had threatened. Instead, more than three months after the end of the last deadline the U.S. administration had set, "biting" sanctions are not even on the horizon. At best we can expect that after weeks of haggling in the United Nations Security Council, there will eventually be much watered-down sanctions that won't be able to stop Tehran.

Engagement with Iran has been based on the false premise that the mullahs would respond to carrots and somehow act in Iran's national interest. In diplomacy, there is only one thing more dangerous than failing to respond firmly to threats to international security, and that is threatening to respond firmly, but failing to follow through. The Iranian regime knows now, if it had any doubts before, that the international community lacks the courage or conviction to confront its nuclear program.

One reason why our leaders pursued a policy of appeasement toward Iran over the past decade was that they argued, falsely, that the only alternative was a military attack on Iran. Biting sanctions, though, could have and still could work. Of course, a military confrontation with Iran would be devastating for its 70 million people. But allowing the regime to gain weapons of mass destruction could in the end be even more devastating for Iran and the entire region if it triggered a wider war. Engaging the mullahs only had the effect of legitimizing them and extending their brutal reign.

It is time for Europe and the United States to redouble their efforts for winning as broad a coalition as possible for biting sanctions that stand a chance of changing the regime's behavior. Equally important will be to politically support the opposition and the millions of brave Iranians marching on the streets and demanding change and democracy. Summits in Washington are fine, but Iran is moving much faster than that. So we'd better catch up.

Mr. Vidal-Quadras, a professor of nuclear physics, is vice president of the European Parliament.

Source:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303828304575179683031919088.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

An unsettled alliance

 By Daniel Dombey and Tobias Buck

Financial Times, London- The world clustered around Barack Obama yesterday - with one very notable exception. Leaders of some 40 countries, from Argentina and Armenia to China and India, gathered in Washington to attend the nuclear security summit convoked by the US president. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, stayed away.

Israeli diplomats attribute Mr Netanyahu's last-minute cancellation to Turkish and Egyptian plans to discuss Israel's nuclear arsenal. But his absence from an event intended to show US allies and partners rallying around the American president's agenda was, at the very least, deeply symbolic.

The US-Israeli alliance, for decades the cornerstone of Middle East power politics, is in rocky shape. The Obama administration is angry about Israeli settlements in occupied East Jerusalem. Mr Netanyahu's government is recoiling at what it depicts as Mr Obama's unreasonable demands.

The tension between the two sides has become a story of personal snubs and policy differences even as the US and Israel profess their devotion to each other. As George Mitchell, Washington's Middle East envoy, prepares to return to the region, US officials are considering eventually issuing outlines of their own for an Israeli-Palestinian deal - a turn of events Israel is desperate to avoid.

But at root, the differences stem from the two countries' contrasting reactions to an issue seen by both as crucial to their national interest, and, in Israel's case, to its national survival: Iran.

"The principal difference between now and previous administrations is the Iran problem," says a senior US official as he discusses the current US-Israeli stand-off. "From our perspective, it increases the urgency of Israel keeping the international community focused on that problem and not on other problems. And the Israelis need all of us to be working together on the common goal of keeping the pressure on the Iranians to back off."

Still, as diplomats and analysts study the underlying causes of the US-Israeli rift, there can be little doubt that the poor personal and political chemistry between Mr Obama and Mr Netanyahu plays a part. Their relationship is clearly much more confrontational than that between President George W. Bush and Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, the former Israeli prime ministers.

Washington officials say Mr Obama was infuriated by Israel's announcement of the expansion of a settlement in occupied East Jerusalem during a fence-mending visit last month by Joe Biden, the vice-president. Little more than a week later, Mr Netanyahu paid one of the most ignominious visits to the White House of any major ally in recent years - out of sight of the media, left to confer with his team in the Roosevelt room while Mr Obama dined without him, and exiting the building without any agreement despite two meetings with the president in a matter of hours.

Mr Netanyahu also presides over perhaps the most rightwing coalition in Israeli history, while Mr Obama is widely perceived as among the most liberal presidents in decades. The Israeli leader is seen in Washington as obstructionist, while many Israelis regard Mr Obama as naive, inexperienced and - worst of all - the architect of a US policy of appeasement.

Mr Obama and Mr Netanyahu share the view that Tehran must be stopped from acquiring nuclear weapons capability, a scenario both maintain would destabilise the wider Middle East and embolden Israel's most committed foes. But there is a fundamental, and increasingly visible, rift on how best to respond. Crudely put, the Americans view Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts as the key ingredient in building an Arab coalition to curb Iran. Israel, by contrast, argues that a lasting Middle East peace is only attainable once the world has dealt with the threat from Tehran.

Speaking to more than 7,000 people at last month's annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac), the powerful pro-Israel lobby group, Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, highlighted the propaganda value of images of the occupied Palestinian territories, calling for Israel to help change "the facts on the ground" to "refute the claims of the rejectionists and extremists and in so doing create the circumstances for a safe, secure future for Israel".

She added: "Behind these terrorist organisations and their rockets, we see the destabilising influence of Iran. Now, reaching a two-state solution will not end all these threats . . . but failure to do so gives the extremist foes a pretext to spread violence, instability and hatred."

The US is also stepping up work with Arab states to contain Tehran. But as General David Petraeus, head of US central command, said last month: "If you go to moderate leaders in the Arab world they will tell you that the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process causes them problems."

Mr Netanyahu's government treats the rise of Iran - and its nuclear ambitions - as an issue so urgent it leaves the peace talks in the shade. On his last trip to Washington he told members of Congress that the Palestinians were not presently a willing partner for peace. He also encouraged the passage of unilateral US sanctions legislation against companies investing in Iran - despite the Obama administration's objections.

The White House was not happy. "The more you resort to throwing your weight around in someone else's backyard the less compunction they will have about doing the same," says Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator now at the New America Foundation think-tank in the US.

In his own speech to Aipac, the Israeli prime minister brushed aside any suggestion that the broader conflict between the Muslim world and the west was linked to Israel: "Militant Islam does not hate the west because of Israel. It hates Israel because of the west - because it sees Israel as an outpost of freedom and democracy that prevents them from overrunning the Middle East."

This is not a view widely shared outside Israel. "We are all saying to Israel that if the main threat in the area is indeed Iran then they are not on the right road for a solution," says a senior western diplomat, stressing European and Russian support for Mr Obama's position.

The logic sketched out by the US and its allies goes as follows: containing Iran requires an Arab coalition; an Arab coalition requires an Israeli-Palestinian peace process; an Israeli-Palestinian peace process requires Israeli concessions; and the Israeli concession required right now is a halt to new settlement building in occupied East Jerusalem. In her Aipac speech, Mrs Clinton also argued that, in the absence of a peace deal, demographic trends and other factors put Israel's long-term survival as a democratic Jewish state at risk.

"They can stick to their position of principle on East Jerusalem but just because they can doesn't mean they have to," the senior US official says of the Israeli government. "And that's what we are suggesting, just out of their own self interest - some forbearance there to make it possible for the Palestinians to be more forthcoming."

Israeli analysts close to the Netanyahu government see things differently. "President Barack Obama capitalised on a minor Israeli glitch [the announcement during Mr Biden's visit] . . . to fabricate a crisis in USIsraeli relations," says Efraim Inbar, the director of the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Affairs. "This appears to fit Obama's overall foreign policy approach of estranging democratic allies while appeasing anti-American dictators."

Yet to other Israelis the fighting talk of the country's political right masks a dangerous complacency. They note that Israel has become even more dependent on US military and diplomatic support than in the past.

"If you look at the threat perception in Israel, the threat is mainly considered to be coming from Iran. But it is also quite evident that Israel cannot deal with the Iranian threat on its own," says Shlomo Brom, a senior analyst at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies and the former director of the army's strategic planning division.

It is a view widely shared among US analysts. Israel, they say, is likely to need US assistance for any effective military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities - and to deal with the backlash certain to follow such an attack.

Meanwhile, there is considerable discomfort in Washington about some of Mr Netanyahu's language on Iran, which he has likened in the past to Nazi Germany. "I don't think it is in America's interest or of anybody else who is a friend of America to encourage America into a collision with Iran," says Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former US national security adviser. "The issue really is how can one achieve an outcome which is going to be good for the American national interest, ensure Israel's indefinite well-being and security, and some measure of genuine justice for the Palestinians?"

Many people maintain that Israel and the US will ultimately be able to patch up their differences and resume their traditional close relations. Powerful forces in Washington feel uncomfortable with the current tensions. Many conservatives view Israel as an ally unlike any other, a fellow democracy in a sea of authoritarian states. The administration's stance has found opposition or only muted support on Capitol Hill, where Aipac remains a formidable force despite increasing divisions among Jewish-Americans themselves. Leading Republicans have voiced sharp criticism of the tougher line on Israel.

That kind of support leads some Israelis to believe Mr Netanyahu can, and should, defy US pressure. As Dore Gold, the president of the Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs and a former Netanyahu adviser, says: "The relationship between the US and Israel is not restricted to their governments . . . The people of the US are with us and Congress is certainly with us."

One thing is clear: even as the diplomatic tensions mount, no one in Washington is questioning the American commitment to Israel's security, a pledge described by Mrs Clinton as "rock-solid, unwavering, enduring and for ever". She boasted in her Aipac speech that Washington was increasing the $3bn military assistance the US delivers to Israel each year. Nor does the Obama administration see much scope in reducing other subsidies to Israel. All the same, some officials are looking at one possible source of pressure: eventually issuing US "parameters" or guidelines for a peace deal.

The Obama administration is, in other words, shaping a policy more nuanced than its predecessors': it seeks to blend a cast-iron commitment to Israel's security with a much more critical stance on settlement building and the peace process. As Iran continues its progress towards nuclear capability, it is a distinction that seems unlikely to disappear. For Mr Netanyahu and his government, uncomfortable times lie ahead.

Disputed territories

There are today more than 280,000 settlers living in 121 settlements in the occupied West Bank. There are at least another 180,000 settlers in occupied East Jerusalem. Their presence - in growing numbers - is widely considered one of the main obstacles to a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians because the settlements are located on land the Palestinians want to become part of an independent state. Though some settlers say they are ready to leave their homes should a peace deal ever emerge, others have vowed to fight any attempt to evict them - even by the Israeli government.

The quiet suburb at the centre of the dispute over Israeli settlements

Ramat Shlomo does not look like the centre of a major international dispute, write Tobias Buck and Daniel Dombey . Sitting on a steep hill just a short drive from downtown Jerusalem, the settlement's quiet streets are lined with modern buildings in cream-coloured stone. The residents belong almost entirely to Israel's ultra-orthodox religious minority.

To most Israelis, it is no more than a suburb of Jerusalem. To the rest of the world, however, it is an illegal Jewish settlement built on occupied Palestinian land. That is why a plan, revealed last month, to build an additional 1,600 homes there for settlers sparked a global outcry, as well as a crisis in US-Israeli relations yet to be resolved.

Many Israelis are angry at the sudden focus of US president Barack Obama's administration on settlement-building in East Jerusalem. After all, it follows years in which the US appeared to neglect the issue, and a face-off last year in which Washington was widely perceived to have backed down.

Along with the wider international community, every US administration for more than 40 years has held that Israel is an occupying power in East Jerusalem and the West Bank - the lands conquered, along with the Gaza Strip, during the 1967 war between Israel and its neighbours.

As a result, Washington regards all Israeli settlements on these territories as illegal. East Jerusalem, however, is particularly sensitive: the Palestinians want it as the capital of a future independent state; the Israeli government, in contrast, is committed to maintaining all of the city as the "undivided capital" of the Jewish state.

The Obama administration started with a very different stance from that of George W. Bush, which muted its criticism of settlement-building in the area. Last May, Hillary Clinton, secretary of state, called for building in all occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, to be halted. Eventually, however, she praised as "unprecedented" a 10-month Israeli freeze that covered the West Bank alone.

Today, US officials acknowledge two errors in that confrontation, which they say they will learn from: making explicit demands for a formal freeze, so reducing room for manoeuvre; and failing to plan their response to Israeli resistance to those demands. This time, Mr Obama and Mrs Clinton are pushing for a halt in announcements about East Jerusalem as opposed to a formal freeze. The Israeli leader, however, under intense pressure from rightwing allies to stand up to Washington, has yet to respond formally to the US on how he will handle future construction plans in the contested city.

Source:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7bef087e-4696-11df-9713-00144feab49a.html

Analysis: Allawi win could curb Iran's influence

By HAMZA HENDAWI (Associate Press)

AP - CAIRO — The surprisingly strong election showing by a secular, nationalist coalition in Iraq has provided a sudden opening for the mostly Sunni Arab world to curtail Iranian influence in Iraq, something that has been a source of serious alarm for the United States and its Arab allies since 2003.

The banner headline in Asharq al-Awsat, an influential newspaper in Saudi Arabia, said it all — "The Awakening of Moderation in Iraq" — offering an immediate endorsement of Iraq's top vote-getter by the regional Sunni Arab powerhouse.

The Iraqiya coalition led by Ayad Allawi, a secular Shiite who has campaigned for better ties with the Arab world and keeping neighboring Iran at a distance, won 91 of the new legislature's 325 seats, edging Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's mainly Shiite bloc by only two seats. Allawi was prime minister in 2004-05.

The narrow win foreshadowed possibly months of hard-nosed negotiations over the formation of a new government. But Allawi's numerical victory was triumph enough for the mostly Sunni Arab regimes that have been wary of Shiite-dominated Iraqi governments since the 2003 U.S. invasion that ousted Saddam Hussein.

Sunni Arab governments have long kept their distance from Iraq's postwar governments. They have declined to send full ambassadors — first because of the U.S. occupation, then because of the precarious security and more recently because of their anger over perceived Iranian influence. But they have begun warming toward Iraq, and Allawi's ascension would likely tip the balance.

The United States has long maintained that Iran was fomenting violence in Iraq. Washington charges that Tehran provides Shiite militiamen with money, weapons and training and blames the deaths of hundreds of American soldiers in Iraq on a particularly effective brand of roadside bomb it says is supplied by Iran.

U.S. officials also claimed the banning by a Shiite-led vetting body of hundreds of candidates from running in the March 7 election for their alleged ties to the Saddam regime was inspired by Tehran. Many of those blacklisted were Sunni Arabs. Iran denies the allegations.

Significantly deepening the concern has been Iran's disputed nuclear program and its alleged support for militant groups like Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas in Gaza.

Iran has not officially commented on the election results, which were reported by the state-run news agency without comment. However, a senior lawmaker charged Saturday that Washington and Saudi Arabia had exerted their influence to get their favorite candidates elected.

"That's why the Iraqi elections have definitely been rigged," hard-line lawmaker Esmaeil Kowsari said.

Iran's main challenge to the region — building a sphere of influence extending from Iraq all the way to Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip — makes any Iraqi leader with an anti-Iranian policy a favorite for Arab governments.

Although a Shiite, Allawi is no exception and has enjoyed friendly relations with Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates for years.

"Allawi will be able to strengthen Iraq's relations with the Arab world and will also be able to initiate contacts and improve relations with countries in the region," said Hani Horani, director of the New Jordan Research Center in Amman, Jordan. "He's capable of establishing balanced relations with all Arab countries and reversing Iraq's tendency to lean toward Iran."

The Asharq al-Awsat newspaper headline, which reflected relief as much as joy, mirrors the thinking in Saudi Arabia on Allawi's victory and al-Maliki's potential departure. The daily is owned by powerful members of the Saudi royal family and religiously toes the oil-rich kingdom's foreign policy line.

It is not certain at this point that Allawi will succeed al-Maliki as prime minister, but he stands a good chance if his bloc is able to join forces with enough other political groupings to gain an influential majority.

Even so, there are doubts over Allawi's ability to end or greatly reduce the influence of Iran's hard-line clerical regime, but sentiment against Tehran has been growing among ordinary Iraqis as well.

"Allawi is the hope of all Iraqis," said Fakhry Zaboun, a taxi driver from eastern Baghdad. "He will face up to the Iranians who want to occupy Iraq when the Americans leave."

The subsequent extent of Allawi's success in reducing Iran's influence in Iraq would depend to a large extent on who would be his partners in the next government.

His most likely options are the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, a large Shiite party established with Iranian backing in Tehran in the early 1980s; and supporters of anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, also believed to be linked to the Iranians.

It is doubtful that these two groups would be willing to entirely relinquish their ties with Iran anytime soon, but they could be persuaded to reduce or tone down the more conspicuous manifestations of their ties with Tehran if Allawi demands it as a condition for their participation in his government.

Iran and Iraq both have majority Shiite populations, and are bound by strong religious ties. Iraq also is home to some of the Islamic sect's holiest shrines, which are visited by millions of Iranians every year. Many in Iraq's Shiite political elite lived in exile in Iran for years during Saddam's rule.

Allawi, in contrast, spent most of his years in exile in Britain.

However, the two nations fought a ruinous, eight-year war in the 1980s in which a million people were killed or wounded. Memories of that conflict continue to feed mutual suspicion between Iraqis and Iranians.

Bonds of such complexity and strength are virtually impossible to eradicate, but there is much more leeway when it comes to Iran's political meddling in its neighbor. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect any Iraqi government to be outright hostile toward the country's powerful neighbor.

Amr Hamzawy, director of Middle East research at Carnegie — a Washington-based think tank — sees a gradual rather than instant effort by Allawi to reduce Iranian influence.

"There will certainly be a change of rhetoric, but nothing will change fast on the ground," he said.

Source:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ilEpV7_D2_Xx7h5M9wRyW4LwLCPgD9EN5NAG0

Taliban fighters being taught at secret camps in Iran

The Sunday Times

Miles Amoore in Kabul

THE Taliban fighters scurried up the craggy mountainside. As they neared the top, their 30-strong platoon split into three sections and they launched a ferocious assault on an enemy fort, opening fire from numerous positions.

The bullets they sprayed at the fort’s mud-coloured walls were blank, however. They merely pretended to fire their rocket-propelled grenades. When they reached the desert at the foot of the mountain, they did not race away on motorbikes, but filed into sand-coloured tents to refresh themselves with tea and naan.

The attack was a training exercise overseen by Iranian security officials in plain clothes. The Taliban do not know whether they were police officers, soldiers or secret service agents. What they can say is that in camps along the border between Afghanistan and Iran, Taliban recruits are being taught how to ambush British, American and other Nato troops using guns and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

They are learning to attack checkpoints as well as mountain bases. Iranian instructors are also giving them target practice on desert ranges with Kalashnikov assault rifles.

In the past, Shi’ite Iran has opposed the Sunni Taliban. But western officials say Iran now wants to expand its influence within the Taliban movement.

A Taliban commander who has been trained in Iran said last week: “Our religions and our histories are different, but our target is the same — we both want to kill Americans.”

In recent months, senior American officials have accused Iran of playing “a double game” by training and arming the Taliban while supporting the Afghan government.

Taliban leaders interviewed by The Sunday Times last week provided the first direct evidence of how Iran is training insurgents on its own soil.

According to one Taliban source, emissaries travelled to Iran early last year to discuss a training programme with Iranian officials. The training began during the winter.

Working through local mediators, this newspaper persuaded two Taliban commanders who had attended the programme in Iran to travel to Kabul, the Afghan capital, to tell their stories. The men, interviewed separately in a partially constructed concrete building on the edge of the city, were both extremely nervous. “How do I know you are not spies and that you will not follow me when I leave?” said one before the interview began.

At times, their voices dropped to whispers as they spoke about their role in the insurgency and drank cups of tea on dirty cushions.

One of the commanders, from the central province of Wardak, described how he travelled to Iran with 20 of his men.

His journey took him south into Pakistan, then west to the border with Iran and on to Zahedan, a city of 600,000 people in southeast Iran.

The second Taliban commander, from Ghazni province in southern Afghanistan, took a group of his men on a five-day drive to Nimroz, in the southwest. From there, he crossed into Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province, a hotbed of drug smuggling and tribal rivalry.

The militants paid a $500 fee to Afghan people-smugglers using routes usually taken by refugees looking for work in Iran. They crossed the border at night in cars with the help of Baluch traffickers who guided the groups along dirt tracks to avoid checkpoints. After stopping to rest in the mountains, they headed out again at first light.

Finally, they were met by their Iranian instructors in white Toyota pick-up trucks and were taken to a village on the outskirts of Zahedan, an hour’s drive from the training camps.

There they were placed in basic compounds, each housing up to 30 Taliban fighters, mostly from the south and southeast of Afghanistan where the insurgency against British and American forces is fiercest.

Battered buses and pick-up trucks ferried the militants back and forth between the village and the camps every morning and night.

“Iran paid for the whole trip. We paid the travel fees to begin with and once we got to Iran they refunded us. They paid for our food, our mobile phone cards, any expenses,” said the Ghazni commander.

At one camp, a cluster of low tents erected in the shadow of a mountain, the Taliban fighters conducted live firing exercises, physical training and mountain assaults under the watchful eye of the plain-clothes Iranians, the commander said.

During a course lasting three months, the Iranian instructors worked in groups of two to five men. Their programme was split into three parts, each taking a month to complete.

For the first month, the recruits were taught how to launch complex ambushes on moving convoys. They learnt where to set up firing positions, when to trigger the ambush and how to escape before the enemy had time to respond.

“They were strong on the planning side. We would sit in the tents and they would take us through things like where the best escape routes were, making sure we had good cover and where to place our lookouts,” the commander said.

The second month was spent learning how to plant the roadside bombs that are responsible for most of the deaths of British soldiers in Helmand province. The insurgents were taught to use carefully positioned secondary and tertiary devices to kill or wound rescuers organising medical evacuations.

During the third month, the instructors taught the Taliban how to storm fixed enemy positions, climbing mountains in formation to launch attacks on checkpoints and bases.

“We were told ambushing was a very useful tool compared with a straightforward attack. They taught us how to select a good hiding position and how to limit the enemy’s response to our attacks by laying well- positioned mines,” said the commander. “We can kill a lot of our enemies this way.”

Both commanders said Iran also supplied them with weapons, often paying nomads to smuggle ammunition, mines and guns across the desert and mountain passes between Iran and Afghanistan’s western provinces. The nomads used donkeys, camels and horses to carry the military supplies into provinces such as Ghazni and Wardak, the commanders said.

Although the commanders believed that, after years on the battlefields of Afghanistan, they already possessed some of the skills that were taught in Iran’s camps, they agreed the training had improved their ability to launch more sophisticated attacks.

“I found some elements of the training in Iran very useful, especially the escape and evasion techniques I was taught,” said the commander from Wardak as he showed me video footage of his men patrolling on motorbikes with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenade launchers slung over their shoulders.

The commanders gave no indication of precisely who was behind the training. Late last year General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander of foreign troops in Afghanistan, accused Iran’s al-Quds force — an elite wing of the Revolutionary Guard — of undermining the efforts of the Afghan government and Nato forces.

“The problem with dealing with the Iranian regime is knowing to what extent these initiatives are conducted by local commanders and to what extent they are backed by the government,” said a western defence source. He added that, although he had seen no direct evidence, the accounts of Taliban training camps in Iran were “credible”.

American officials believe Iran’s support for the Taliban has reached “troubling” proportions, although it is not on the same scale as its backing for Shi’ite insurgents in Iraq. The commanders’ accounts suggest the number of Taliban fighters trained in Iran may already have reached the hundreds.

Taliban militants still receive much of their training in neighbouring Pakistan. Elements of the ISI, Pakistan’s secret service, are known to train, equip and fund the Taliban. But a recent crackdown on Taliban safe havens in Pakistan has forced many insurgents to look to Iran for support.

“The military is pressuring the Taliban in Pakistan. It is certainly harder to reach places that were once easy to get into. I think more of my fighters will travel to Iran for training this year,” said the Ghazni commander.

Two weeks ago Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, said of the Iranians: “They want to maintain a good relationship with the Afghan government. They also want to do everything they possibly can to hurt us, or for us not to be successful.”

Days later, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran insisted he wanted to rebuild Afghanistan and criticised the presence of foreign troops.

The Taliban commander from Ghazni province said he had no doubt Iranian police and intelligence services knew about the training camps, however. “The government is not sleeping,” he said. “You just have to wiggle your ears in Iran and they will know about it.”

Source:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article7069817.ece

Iran's Uprising Prospects After February 11: Escalation or Decline?

The Hoffington Post - March 15- On the eve of Chaharchanbeh Souri (Festival of Fire), on the last Tuesday of the Iranian year, which is another occasion for the Iranian people to vent their anger at the regime and express the yearning for change, a review of what happened on the anniversary of the anti-Monarchic revolution on February 11 might offer some insights as to what to expect next as far as the post-June uprisings in Iran is concerned.

This is important because in the aftermath of February 11, a day widely expected to witness the continuation of massive opposition protests in Iran, some in the U.S. media lamented "the relative silence of the opposition"[1] and its "... fail[ure] to mount a presence."[2] At times, this typical perplexity, which gripped the minds of many Iran observers and reporters, even came to the conclusion that, "activists in Iran's political opposition have been left demoralized."[3]

But, such a focus on the perceived "Day of final action" and short-term material gains or losses for the opposition emanates from a lack of understanding of the considerable struggle and sacrifices required to bring another revolution in Iran. It also runs the risk of glossing over the important, perhaps vital, lessons that should be learned from the February 11 experience.

The most significant protest before February 11 erupted nearly a month and a half prior on December 27 (the religious day of Ashura), which rattled the regime's foundations. That is why the regime pushed full-throttle to curb further protests, with various officials joining a chorus of intimidating threats and "ultimatums" against protesters. Consider a small sample of publicly broadcast statements:

Commander of the State Security Forces (SSF), Ismaeel Ahmadi Moghaddam: "There will be absolutely no tolerance ... This time around the police action and the judicial response will be more severe."[4]

Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, Interior Minister: "[Protestors] are moharebs [enemies of God]. And the fate of a mohareb today is absolutely clear [death sentence]. We are issuing this ultimatum."[5]

State-run TV: "Two of the culprits of recent riots were hanged today on charges of moharebeh."[6]

Abol-Ghassem Salavati, judge of Tehran's 15th Branch of the Revolutionary Court, speaking to defendants: "You are charged with moharebeh through conscious, deliberate, and effective support, contact, and cooperation with the terrorist grouplet MEK [The Mujahedin-e Khalq]."[7]

Ministry of Intelligence: "More than 10 people, known members of the anti-revolutionary camp, have been arrested."[8]

These threats complemented the widespread arrests of activists and key protest organizers[9] in order to shut off the engine of the uprising.

In his message to the people of Iran following the February 11 anniversary, Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the exiled Iranian Resistance*[10], elaborated on the regime's suppressive campaign, which culminated in an unprecedentedly dense militarism.[11]

More than 70,000 armed forces, under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the mullahs' loyal protectors, transformed Tehran into a war zone. Specifically, these included six combat brigades and several back-up battalions (numbering 15,000 in total), 200 paramilitary Bassij battalions (40,000 strong), four SSF brigades from special anti-riot units (totaling 6,000 forces), 5,000 forces from 92 police and SSF bases, and 4,000 armed intelligence agents.

Several layers of forces, backed by the Bassij, prevented protesters from reaching Azadi (Freedom) Square. According to TIME magazine, "On Revolution Street, which stretches from Azadi Square eastward, tens of thousands of police forces as well as paramilitary Bassij were standing guard."[12]

Despite these measures, however, thousands took to the streets. Once again, pictures of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his predecessor, Khomeini, were taken down and burnt, while the chants of freedom and "death to dictator" rang louder. In Tehran's northwestern district of Sadeqiya, angry protesters were in virtual control, forcing the police and the Bassij to flee the area and setting government buses on fire.

As if that headache was not enough, the regime encountered another disgraceful defeat. Despite thousands of buses brought to Tehran,[13] the number of people taking part in the government-organized rally was far fewer than in previous years. And, contrary to every other year, there were no marches on Azadi Street. Empty parts of Azadi Square were clearly noticeable by pictures even published by state-run news agencies like Mehr.[14]

The Essential Question of Leadership
There is no question that the February 11 uprising could have reached a higher apex. The most obvious and basic constraining factor in this regard was the dense militarism led by the IRGC. Although the most essential motivating ideological force for the IRGC is the export of Islamic fundamentalism through the use of terrorism, starting two-and-a-half years ago, as crises piled up, the IRGC started to play a more predominant role in domestic crackdown. In September 2007, Mohammad Ali Jafari, then-new commander of the IRGC, declared "confronting domestic threats" to be the IRGC's new strategy "enabling it to act appropriately in the face of the enemy's political, social and security threats."[15]

Some pundits argued that in the face of the IRGC's growing role in domestic crackdown, the uprising was in decline after the protests on February 11 did not meet expectations. This conclusion ignores two important realities on the ground.

First, aside from the fact that it would be impossible to sustain such a show of force for a prolonged period of time, the indisputable fact is that the perceived aura and real hegemony of the regime's cornerstone (supreme leader) has been shattered irrevocably in the course of the post-June 2009 protests.

Second, contrary to what some Iran analysts have suggested, the forces calling for overthrow of the regime have not become aloof, pessimistic and demoralized. They seek more not less; they demonstrated this by rising up once again on February 11 while exhibiting as much courage as they possibly could under the circumstances.

Despite defying the regime's unprecedented show of force, however, demonstrators are looking for genuine leadership and organization.[16] Indeed, in a situation where society has reached an explosive state and the regime is on the brink, the primary issue revolves around what the alternative force and who the leadership are. These determine the strategic path the uprising will ultimately take. In the present circumstances, on the whole, there are only two general paths available. One is to preserve and reform the current regime from within; the other is to overthrow the regime in its totality in favor of democratic change.

If history is any guide, the Tehran regime has proven itself to be incapable of reform. Indeed, four years ago, Khamenei explicitly warned, "Any retreat ... would generate an endless chain of pressures and further retreats."[17] So, central to the debate is who can walk the path of democratic change most proficiently?

Obviously, Mir Hossein Mousavi and other leaders of the defeated faction did not rise to the occasion. As the uprising escalated, prompting greater trepidation within the ruling faction, Mousavi quickly distanced himself from the millions in the streets, saying in a statement, "With regards to the Ashura ceremonies, despite countless requests, neither Mehdi Karroubi, nor Mohammad Khatami nor I or my friends issued a statement."[18]

Moreover, Mousavi kowtowed to Khamenei's main demand by lashing out against the Mujahedin-e Khalq (PMOI/MEK),[19] and once again affirming loyalty to the regime's constitution. "I deem it necessary to affirm the identity of ourselves and the Green Movement as Islamic, nationalistic, opposed to foreign domination and loyal to the constitution,"[20] he emphasized. He even withdrew his earlier challenge to the illegitimacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency. Instead, he demanded "direct declaration of accountability by the [current] government before the people, the Majlis and the Judiciary."[21]

On February 9, a set of 23 guidelines about the February 11 rally was published by the "collective wisdom of the Green Movement."[22] The authors pleaded against chanting "uncharacteristic" slogans such as "death to dictator," recommending instead "dignified and respectful slogans."

Such a retreat did not impress Khamenei, who was obviously not content with anything less than complete surrender. One of his allies, the Qom Friday prayer leader, said, "Some people who were deceived during these incidents stubbornly struck the same tune as the US. In addition to expressing remorse and asking for forgiveness, these people must prepare themselves for divine punishment."[23]

Mousavi's de facto capitulation raised questions as to whether he truly posses the capability to be the leader who can change and overthrow the regime or at least reform it. If he and likeminded politicians could exhibit that capacity or willpower, which is contingent upon rejecting the velayat-e faqih [absolute clerical rule], then, as Mr. Rajavi emphasized, other political forces, including the MEK, should accept their hegemony while maintaining their own independent viewpoints. However, sadly, the events of the past months, especially after Ashura, have proven the exact opposite.

In the face of Mousavi's repeated retreats, the regime has placed growing attention on the MEK as its main target and chief existential threat in the midst of popular protests. A forum affiliated with Khamenei wrote, "Today, Mr. Mousavi is facing a terrible dilemma ... Only a few rioters remain who do not even take orders from him, but rather comply with the commands sent from London, Washington, Haifa, and Camp Ashraf."[24]

Home to more than 3,400 MEK members, who are considered protected persons under the Geneva Conventions, Camp Ashraf (Iraq) acts as an inspiration to protesters in Iran, especially women and young people, who seek democratic change. For this reason, it is a major thorn in the regime's eye.

Two days after the Ashura uprising, in a government-staged rally in Tehran, Ahmad Alam-ol-hoda, Friday prayer leader of Mashhad, acknowledged, "The Monafeqin [Mujahedin] commanded the actions carried out on Ashura. The rioters chanted the same slogans that had been published on [MEK's] website since December 7 [Student Day]. So, the unrest on Ashura was directed by the [MEK]."[25] On February 2, the ruling faction even attributed the slogans chanted by Mousavi's supporters to the MEK, warning, "The placards, chants and shouts are written with the MEK's green pen."[26]

Khamenei's goal is clear: Force Mousavi into retreat in Tehran and suppress the MEK in Camp Ashraf. For the regime, the MEK poses the most serious threat capable of leading the popular protests towards democratic change, because of its presence in Ashraf along the Iranian border and vast organizational capabilities inside Iran.[27]

Following the 2003 Iraq War, the regime's allies in Baghdad exerted enormous pressure on MEK members in Ashraf at the behest of the regime. But, since the start of the uprisings, those measures have been immeasurably intensified after repeated requests by the regime and its Supreme Leader.[28]

Conclusion
So, in addition to the dense militarism and the role of the IRGC acting as the "basis," it is evident that the leadership factor was the defining "condition" which could have completely changed the outcome of the February 11 uprising.

That being said, the nine-month long uprising has ascended and, regardless of crackdown, it will not decline. Rather, it will escalate further and guide future developments along the lines of toppling the clerical regime and establishing democracy in Iran. The most essential factor in this equation is leadership and organization, which can lead to an enduring alternative for democratic change after unseating the ruling theocracy.

Endnotes:
[1] "Iran's Anniversary: Where Was the Opposition?" TIME, February 11, 2010
[2] Ibid.
[3] "Iranian opposition demoralized after failed protests at revolution's anniversary," by Thomas Erdbrink, Washington Post, February 20, 2010

[4] Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, IRIB, December 30, 2009.
[5] Ibid, January 3, 2010.
[6] Ibid, December 29, 2009.
[7] Ibid, January 18, 2010.
[8] Ibid, December 29, 2009.
[9] For example, the names and particulars of more than 5,000 active opponents from various parts of Tehran were entered by the regime's agents into electronic databases.
*[10] Iranian Resistance generally refers to the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a 530-member Parliament-in-exile, which also includes five different Iranian opposition organizations. It was formed in 1981 and seeks the establishment of a pluralist, secular republic. The Mujahedin-e Khalq is the largest member organization in the NCRI.
[11] Massoud Rajavi, "Lessons from February 11th," broadcast on Simay-e Azadi, Iran National Television, February12, 2010. http://mojahedin.com/pages/detailsNews.aspx?newsid=53750.
[12] "Iran's Anniversary: Where Was the Opposition?" TIME, February 11, 2010
[13] "From early morning [the regime] bussed in tens of thousands of supporters to fill Azadi Square for the official celebrations. Opposition websites said that they were lured by free food and drinks. Other sources said that government employees were compelled to attend." See "Iranian regime ships in support for anniversary celebrations," The Times, February 12, 2010.
[14] http://www.mehrnews.com/mehr_media/image/2010/02/514341_orig.jpg
[15] BBC, September 29, 2007.
[16] One routinely comes across statements like these: "We have lost our fear but we need to know where to go with our new-found courage" (See "Iranian regime ships in support for anniversary celebrations," The Times, February 12, 2010 ). Or: "Our movement needs new tactics, but I have no idea what we should do," Thomas Erdbrink, "Iranian opposition demoralized after failed protests at revolution's anniversary," Washington Post, February 20, 2010 ).
[17] Khamenei's speech, State radio, March 14, 2006.
[18] Kalame website, January 1, 2010: http://www.kaleme.org/1388/10/11/klm-7047.
[19] "As a loyalist, I say that the MEK have died in virtue of their own treachery and crimes. You should not resurrect them for the sake of scoring factional points or taking revenge."
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Irani Sezavar-e Irani ("An Iran deserving of Iranians") website, February 9, 2010, http://greenmovement.blogsky.com/1388/11/20/post-52/
[23] Talay-e Daaran (Vanguards) website, February 19, 2010, http://talaieh-daran.blogspot.com/
[24] Tribun-e Azad (Free Podium), February 9, 2010. http://www.tanews.ir/details.php?cat=latestnews&id=1547
[25] IRIB, op. cit.
[26] Raja News, February 2, 2010.
[27] "Five Iranians Facing Trial Belong To Exile Group," Reuters News Agency, January 8, 2010, IRNAhttp://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE6071LE
[28] Document - Iraq: Human rights briefing, Amnesty International, March 1, 2010. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/004/2010/en/20f0c384-7dc6-409d-a0fb-767c349ef41c/mde140042010en.html

Source:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ali-safavi/irans-uprising-prospects_b_498789.html